Thomas Hobbes begins his magnum
opus with one of the most materialist accounts of mind in the history of
philosophy. The obvious question that
confronts any reader of Hobbes is why this is appropriate in a work on
political science. A less obvious
question is what it says about Hobbes’ view of man and God. Here is the opening of the second chapter, “On
Imagination”. I have added additional
paragraph breaks.
THAT when a thing lies still, unless
somewhat else stir it, it will lie still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts
of. But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless
somewhat else stay it, though the reason be the same (namely, that nothing can
change itself), is not so easily assented to.
For men measure, not
only other men, but all other things, by themselves: and because they find
themselves subject after motion to pain and lassitude, think everything else
grows weary of motion, and seeks repose of its own accord; little considering
whether it be not some other motion wherein that desire of rest they find in
themselves consisteth.
From hence it is that
the schools say, heavy bodies fall downwards out of an appetite to rest, and to
conserve their nature in that place which is most proper for them; ascribing
appetite, and knowledge of what is good for their conservation (which is more
than man has), to things inanimate, absurdly.
The first two sentences introduce
the concept of inertia and grounds it in the claim that “nothing can change
itself”. This principle is fundamental,
as I think that it constitutes a deliberate rejection of Aristotelian
biology. Aristotle supposed that nature
was precisely a motion that originated in the organism; for what is life,
except something that can move itself, either in space or by development over
time? If nothing can move itself, then
everything is moved by something else.
If that is so, then whence comes the source of all motion? This seems to suggest a perfectly determined,
mechanical Kosmos consisting of matter and motion alone.
The second part explains why
the principle of inertia seems contrary to common sense experience. We are used to the idea that a rock will not
leap up into the sky and that a rock thrown into the air will return to earth
and remain there. We base the idea that
motion requires an explanation whereas rest does not on our own lethargy.
The third part is a direct
attack on Aristotelian physics.
Aristotle and the Aristotelians seem to have supposed that basic
substances (earth, air, fire and water) had a natural place to which they
naturally return. Of course, Aristotle
also recognized that the place of some things such as the heavenly bodies
included motion, so Hobbes is being a little bit unfair here.
What is the point of this
physical reference? The second paragraph
explains.
When a body is once in motion, it moveth (unless something
else hinder it) eternally; and whatsoever hindreth it, cannot in an instant,
but in time, and by degrees, quite extinguish it: and as we see in the water,
though the wind cease, the waves give not over rolling for a long time after;
so also it happeneth in that motion which is made in the internal parts of a
man, then, when he sees, dreams, etc.
For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, we still
retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And
this is it the Latins call imagination, from the image made in seeing, and
apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call
it fancy, which signifies appearance, and is as proper to one sense as to
another. Imagination, therefore, is nothing but decaying sense; and is found in
men and many other living creatures, as well sleeping as waking.
Hobbes presents us with a model
of internal human experience. All the
contents of the mind originate in the external world. External motions collide with the senses,
which transfer the motion to the nerves and then to the brain. There the internal motions result in images
of external objects. The internal
motions do not maintain their original force, which is why our memories of
things are less vivid than direct observations.
When new motions come in they frequently overwhelm the decaying motions
that constitute the mind’s present contents.
Within the mind, such motions are constantly competing with one
another. Yet clearly, some motions
received from outside keep going for long periods of time, which explains long
term memories.
What Hobbes is after is an
explanation of ghosts. He has a theory
of dreaming.
And seeing dreams are caused by the distemper of some of the
inward parts of the body, diverse distempers must needs cause different dreams.
And hence it is that lying cold breedeth dreams of fear, and raiseth the
thought and image of some fearful object, the motion from the brain to the
inner parts, and from the inner parts to the brain being reciprocal; and that
as anger causeth heat in some parts of the body when we are awake, so when we
sleep the overheating of the same parts causeth anger, and raiseth up in the
brain the imagination of an enemy.
This gives rise to the belief in
ghosts.
We read of Marcus Brutus (one that had his life given him by
Julius Caesar, and was also his favorite, and notwithstanding murdered him),
how at Philippi, the night before he gave battle to Augustus Caesar, he saw a
fearful apparition, which is commonly related by historians as a vision, but,
considering the circumstances, one may easily judge to have been but a short
dream. For sitting in his tent, pensive and troubled with the horror of his
rash act, it was not hard for him, slumbering in the cold, to dream of that which
most affrighted him; which fear, as by degrees it made him wake, so also it
must needs make the apparition by degrees to vanish: and having no assurance
that he slept, he could have no cause to think it a dream, or anything but a
vision.
The confusion caused by
dreaming gives rise to a false belief that the dead can reappear. Such beliefs are important politically
because unscrupulous men can exploit the fear of such things.
And for fairies, and walking ghosts, the opinion of them
has, I think, been on purpose either taught, or not confuted, to keep in credit
the use of exorcism, of crosses, of holy water, and other such inventions of
ghostly men. Nevertheless, there is no doubt but God can make unnatural
apparitions: but that He does it so often as men need to fear such things more
than they fear the stay, or change, of the course of Nature, which he also can
stay, and change, is no point of Christian faith.
But evil men, under pretext that God can do anything, are so
bold as to say anything when it serves their turn, though they think it untrue;
it is the part of a wise man to believe them no further than right reason makes
that which they say appear credible. If this superstitious fear of spirits were
taken away, and with it prognostics from dreams, false prophecies, and many
other things depending thereon, by which crafty ambitious persons abuse the
simple people, men would be would be much more fitted than they are for civil
obedience.
That last part, I think,
explains the political function of Hobbes materialist science. If men did not believe in ghosts, if they
were not subject to confusion about the nature of reality, then they would be
more fit for civil obedience.
Hobbes lived at the end of a
long period of terrible religious wars.
It was not, however, the belief in personal ghosts (like Hamlet’s
father) that made so many men ungovernable.
It was their belief in the Holy Ghost.
Hobbes has to be careful. He
cannot explicitly the Christian faith.
He does, however, give us clues as to his inexplicit thoughts.
Also because whatsoever,
as I said before, we conceive has been perceived first by sense, either all at
once, or by parts, a man can have no thought representing anything not subject
to sense. No man therefore can conceive anything, but he must conceive it in
some place; and endued with some determinate magnitude; and which may be
divided into parts; nor that anything is all in this place, and all in another
place at the same time; nor that two or more things can be in one and the same
place at once: for none of these things ever have or can be incident to sense,
but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit, without any signification at all,
from deceived philosophers and deceived, or deceiving, Schoolmen.
So Hobbes tells us that we can
have no concept of God because we can have no concept of the infinite. So far, so good; as this is nothing that
Aquinas or Maimonides would not say.
Then he goes on to say that any words not grounded in sense perception
are absurd speeches from deceived philosophers and deceived, or deceiving,
Schoolmen. I think we can put two and
two together.
As evil men exploit the
superstitious fears of their fellows in order to encourage civil disobedience,
so Hobbes intends to exploit modern science to make men more governable. His materialistic account of the human being
is introduced to wean men, by degrees, from belief in external powers and
heavenly rewards. If this life is all we
have, then the best that most of us can hope for is comfortable
self-preservation. That is a person more
fit for civil obedience.
I end by noting that, while
Hobbes’ physics are sound, it is sound only at the level of physics. His materialism can account for matter alone;
it cannot account for biological wholes.
Aristotle’s view that living organisms are self-moving beings is
altogether viable and essential for a science of biology. I suggest also that the notion of self-moving
organisms is the metaphysical ground of human autonomy, something that is
certainly diminished in Hobbes political philosophy.
