Friday, August 21, 2020

The Solid Natural Foundation for Human Moral Equality

I believe I heard this from Professor Harry Jaffa, but it was a long time ago and I am going from memory alone.  If my memory is wrong, neither Professor Jaffa nor Mortimer Adler bear any responsibility.

Adler was teaching a class on classical texts during the Second World War.  As so many young men were missing from the home front, Adler’s class consisted entirely of women.  He was trying to illustrate the concept of human nature with this scenario.  “Suppose a creature entered the room.  He is eight feet tall, covered in hair, with fangs.  He sits down in one of these chairs and discusses the classical texts with us.  Would that be a man?”  After a brief pause for thought, one of the young ladies replied: “Well, Mr. Adler, times are hard.”

That joke, as I remember it, perfectly expresses the point I was making in my last post.  Adler’s imaginary monster may not belong to the biological species Homo sapiens, but he shows clear signs of being human in a moral sense.  He can read and communicate in auditory symbols, which suggests the uniquely human power (on this planet in this age) of logos. 

Is this a secure foundation for the doctrine of unalienable rights expressed in the Declaration of Independence?  I submit that it provides the most secure foundation possible: it works for anyone who can recognize the difference between plants, non-human animals, and human beings.

There is a very good reason why we recognize that animals and plants have a very different moral status.  We are concerned enough about animals that we punish people who abuse them.  We live in weird times but, so far as I know, no one has been arrested for abusing a carrot.  The reason is that the two kinds of organisms occupy very different levels on the existential pyramid.  Plants can flourish or wither, but they cannot suffer.  Animals can suffer and because we recognize that we do or should care about how we treat them.  This moral fact is a robust as the difference between a horse and a horse chestnut. 

The same order of distinction presents between human beings and animals.  Perhaps we shouldn’t exploit animals at all, let alone eat them, the way we do plants.  Some people believe that.  No reasonable person can say that we ought to give a dog the vote or allow her a space for liberty and the pursuit of happiness.  Dogs are, by nature, capable of no such things. 

The phrase “all men are created equal,” understanding “men” to mean all human beings, is grounded in such distinctions.  I can conceive of no better ground for human rights than in the nature of the creatures that we encounter in this world.