Steven Forde kindly left a
comment on a recent post devoted to his conference paper. He tantalizingly suggested that more may be
forthcoming. To keep the matter at the
forefront of the blog, I will reply here.
It is true that "moral" behavior is selected for,
but I don't see in Darwinism how it's selected because it's moral. If
"immoral" behavior led to success, that would be selected for
instead. If you mean simply that whatever serves the common good is moral, then
bees are moral even though they behave robotically. My point is simply that, to
the extent we serve the common good due to emotions that have evolved, we are
robotic too to that extent.
Or are you arguing that bees really are moral, even though
robotic?
There are two issues here that
need to be teased apart. One is the
question of what makes a behavior genuinely moral. The other involves the question of
determinism: if our moral behavior and emotions are selected for, does that
mean they are “robotic”. Connected to
this is the question whether robotic behavior can be in some sense moral.
On the first, I reply that a
behavior can be genuinely moral in a number of ways. It might be moral because it conforms to some
moral standard (perhaps transcendent) that defines moral behavior. I doubt that there is selection for some behavior
because it conforms to some standard
of divine right, unless the Divine Legislator is actively intervening.
A second way that a behavior
could be genuinely moral is that done out of a moral motive. This might be a purely rational motive (as in
Kantian ethics) or it might lie in some moral emotion such as compassion or a
sense of fairness. If such actions are
genuinely moral, then they may be selected for precisely for that reason. A person likely to act in accord with moral
reason or moral emotion may well be more likely to form and sustain strong
cooperative communities. Someone who
feels guilty about cheating and ashamed to be caught at it will very probably
make a better partner and citizen.
If such communities promote
reproductive success, then moral motives will be selected for. Again, actions are not moral because they are
selected for; they are selected for because they are genuinely moral.
A third way that an action can
be moral is if it is logically
moral. As an unreformed Platonist, I
hold that justice is an idea. Whenever
there is a range of choices and the chooser is tempted to do what he ought not
to do, there the situation involves logically moral choices. This is true whether we are talking about honest
bankers or honey bees.
A honey bee worker ought to
serve the Queens offspring exclusively, taking her Darwinian interest into
account. She will get more of her own
genes into future generations that way than she could by any other
behavior. However, she is reproductive
capable and may be tempted to birth and tend her own sons. If she and enough of her sisters get away
with this, the hive will collapse. So
yes, I think that bees can be moral (and immoral) in this sense, even if
robotic.
One may well insist that only
actions that are consciously moral are genuinely moral. I would not object, though I would insist
that the logic of genuine morality is present even in merely robotic
creatures.
As to the second question, I am
underwhelmed by the case for determinism.
While I don’t think that a determinist view of the Kosmos can be ruled
out, neither can it be ruled in. What is
most important is that it is useless.
Even in physics it is questionable.
In biology, let alone ethics, one can only proceed by speaking of
probabilities and options.
The fact that a behavior is
selected for does not at all entail that it is robotic. Our emotions are doubtlessly selected for and
this precisely because they make it possible for us to make good choices. If the baby needs a bath but the kitchen is
on fire, an emotionally healthy human being knows what to do with the bath
water. If the fascist at the door asks
me whether I have seen any Jews, and indeed I have because three of them are
hiding in my upstairs closet, my response will not be in any meaningful sense “robotic”. I may well be tempted to do the wrong thing
out of fear for myself and my family. I
will be capable of doing the right thing if I am a morally enabled person. What I will do is up to me and that is what being a moral person amounts to.
