Adler was teaching a class on classical
texts during the Second World War. As so
many young men were missing from the home front, Adler’s class consisted
entirely of women. He was trying to
illustrate the concept of human nature with this scenario. “Suppose a creature entered the room. He is eight feet tall, covered in hair, with
fangs. He sits down in one of these
chairs and discusses the classical texts with us. Would that be a man?” After a brief pause for thought, one of the young
ladies replied: “Well, Mr. Adler, times are hard.”
That joke, as I remember it, perfectly
expresses the point I was making in my last post. Adler’s imaginary monster may not belong to
the biological species Homo sapiens, but he shows clear signs of being human in
a moral sense. He can read and communicate
in auditory symbols, which suggests the uniquely human power (on this planet in
this age) of logos.
Is this a secure foundation for
the doctrine of unalienable rights expressed in the Declaration of Independence? I submit that it provides the most secure
foundation possible: it works for anyone who can recognize the difference
between plants, non-human animals, and human beings.
There is a very good reason why
we recognize that animals and plants have a very different moral status. We are concerned enough about animals that we
punish people who abuse them. We live in
weird times but, so far as I know, no one has been arrested for abusing a carrot. The reason is that the two kinds of organisms
occupy very different levels on the existential pyramid. Plants can flourish or wither, but they
cannot suffer. Animals can suffer and
because we recognize that we do or should care about how we treat them. This moral fact is a robust as the difference
between a horse and a horse chestnut.
The same order of distinction
presents between human beings and animals.
Perhaps we shouldn’t exploit animals at all, let alone eat them, the way
we do plants. Some people believe
that. No reasonable person can say that
we ought to give a dog the vote or allow her a space for liberty and the
pursuit of happiness. Dogs are, by nature,
capable of no such things.
The phrase “all men are created
equal,” understanding “men” to mean all human beings, is grounded in such
distinctions. I can conceive of no better
ground for human rights than in the nature of the creatures that we encounter
in this world.
Missing from this is an explanation for why the recognition of suffering gives us an obligation to prevent it or to refrain from causing it.
ReplyDeleteAnd I'm not sure such an obligation always exists.
Sometimes we cause suffering by doing positive things. Giving vaccines. Doing surgery. Isn't there anything more to this equation? And why suffering rather than, say, joy? Do we have an obligation to make people happy, just because they are capable of being so? If not, what, other than capacity to feel, creates an obligation or makes a certain behavior right?
1) Suppose that causing unnecessary suffering is wrong and that God forbids it. Is it wrong because he forbids it or does he forbid it because it's wrong? The former is logically secure as God's command is by definition obligatory. It is insufficient because even divine law must be interpreted in the light of the function of justice. Should a Jewish soldier fight or a Jewish doctor save a life on the Sabbath? Aquinas answered the either/or question as yes. A Native American parable goes like this: each of us has two wolves inside, a good one and a bad one. Which one is bigger? The one we feed. That is Plato's Republic in a handful of words.
ReplyDelete2) Of course it is both just and proper, on occasion, to cause someone to suffer or accept it for oneself. The aim in such cases is to prevent greater suffering (the disease treated or prevented).
3) How much we are obligated to invest in the happiness of others is a problem for all approaches to morality. If a ball lands in my yard and I can make an unfamiliar child happy by tossing it back, I would acknowledge an obligation.
4) What creates obligations? See the wolf parable above.
Somehow, I missed this wonderful answer. I apologize.
ReplyDelete1) This question will never stop bothering me. But I like Aquinas's answer.
2) Fair. I can't think of an exception off the top of my head.
3) I still do not see what creates these obligations and I don't think that simply saying that something is a problem for all approaches to morality gives us any kind of answer.
The question of how much we owe others is a matter of degree. The question of whether we owe anyone anything at all is what bothers you. The moral dimension opens up whenever there is a difference between what I want to do and what I ought to do. I want to eat, drink, smoke, do this to this but... it would be bad for me. Because I am a human being, endowed with moral emotions, I will frequently feel guilty about doing what I ought not. This is so even if the consequences apply directly only to myself.
ReplyDeletePlato/Socrates as a matter of seeing through the illusion (it looks good) to the reality (it IS bad). Because Socrates had such vision (to accept Plato's account) he was morally perfect.
If I were a solitary creature, like a male tiger or grizzly bear, yet endowed with the moral emotions described above, my obligations would be limited to my self-interest. Some modern philosophers have tried to build a moral system on that slender foundation... unsuccessfully.
Because I am a familial and political animal, my obligations extend to wife and children, friends and the polis. I can't be me without them, so what I ought to do includes my obligations to them. If it's no mystery that I am obligated to care about the health of my body, it is not mystery that I am obligated to care about the body politic of these United States.
Should I care about the Iranians? At least this far: I/we should not deal with them unjustly. The two wolves analogy applies. Socrates argues in the Republic that unjust actions toward others encourages disorder in one's own soul. Thucydides makes the case that a ruthless and immoral foreign policy leads to the same politics within the city.
If a healthy body, soul, and political community is not sufficient grounds for moral obligations, I am no sure what would ever do.
PS. Plato addresses your question directly in two dialogues. The Republic is his most thorough answer but it covers a lot of ground. My favorite dialogue is the Gorgias. I will be discussing it next week with a small class on Zoom. I think I can record the discussion. I will try to make it available to you, if you are interested.
ReplyDelete