Conservative critics of the
biosocial sciences general view the latter as reductionist. They see it as a series of defeats. The human mind is reduced to neurobiology, virtue
and morality to raw self-interest, human beings to mere animals, animals to
accidental products of blind evolutionary processes and those processes to molecular
collisions. I have long seen exactly the
opposite in these same sciences. I have
argued in these pages that biology in general and evolutionary biology in
particular are not and cannot be reductionist sciences. The consequences of this insight are
metaphysically robust.
Leo Strauss wrote that
It is safer to try to understand the
low in the light of the high than the high in the light of the low. In doing
the latter one necessarily distorts the high, whereas in doing the former one
does not deprive the low of the freedom to reveal itself as fully as what it
is.
That is a clear and penetrating a
rejection of reductionism. I am in
complete agreement and I think that evolutionary biology in general and the
biosocial sciences in particular conform to Strauss’s principle. The simplest understanding of the distinction
between the high and the low goes like this: the high comprehends the low but
is neither comprehended by nor exhausted by the low. To take a simple example: consider the First
Methodist Church in Aberdeen, South Dakota.
It is made of bricks, wood, plaster, pipes, wire, and glass, among other
things. While it includes all of these
things, none of them is sufficient to explain why it came to be or why it has
been sustained over the last century. To
understand that, you have to know something about the human turn toward the
Divine, along with a lot of knowledge about human beings form societies,
cooperate and pool resources, form networks, etc.
I was led to these thoughts this
week when reading a marvelous essay: “Evolution of cooperation and control of
cheating in a social microbe,” by Joan E. Strassmann and David C. Queller (PNAS,
vol. 108, suppl. 2). Strassman and
Queller believe that Dictylostelium
discoideum, an occasionally social amoeba, is an excellent model for the
evolution of cooperation and the transition in evolutionary history from single
cells to multicellular organisms.
D.
discoideum amoebae live as singular cells, engulfing their bacterial
prey when there is plenty of the latter.
When food runs out, they aggregate.
They form a slug which, after it has found a suitable perch, transforms
into a stalk and bulb formation. In the
bulb are amoebae that have become spores, armored to a ride on the belly of
some passing insect or other animal.
All of this extraordinarily functional
behavior depends upon mere molecules. The
amoebae secrete a molecule called “prestarvation factor”. This is part of a quorum sensing
mechanism. It tells each amoeba how
dense the population of its fellows is in the immediate neighborhood. As long as there is enough food, the factor
is suppressed. When the population grows
and the food runs out, it triggers the social stage (or the sexual stage, but I’ll
leave that one for later). Understanding
how the molecules work in the mechanisms of the cells is work for a molecular
biologist. One cannot understand what the organism is doing without
understanding that it is trying to do
something. The whole includes all
the stages of the organism, from single cell to hopeful tower.
The most interesting thing that
Strassmann and Queller explain is that D.
discoideum is a political animal (my phrase). Its strategy requires a social contract, with
benefits for cooperation and penalties for cheating. The amoebae are not all genetically
identical. They are divided into diverse
clones with distinct traits and distinct reproductive interests. Any clone that exists is the offspring of
previous amoebae that successfully navigated the process of sustenance, transportation
and reproduction. That defines its
interest in the process.
When a stalk and bulb is formed,
all the amoebae that form the stalk will die.
Only those that end up in the spores will have a genetic future. That doesn’t matter when the stalk and bulb
are formed by a single clone. However,
the construction project frequently includes more than one clone. The stalk and bulb are a chimera, an organism
with more than one genetic identity. In that
case, there is an opportunity for cheating.
One clone might allow another to form the stalk without contributing to
that work. A clone that can get all of
its team into spores would cheat a clone that did stalk work.
That would mean, however, that
the cheated clone would eventually disappear from the gene pool. If that happens, there is no one left to
cheat. The system does not have to be
egalitarian. Some clones can do better
than others, at least temporarily. The
system does have to demand contributions from every party and distribute
benefits to every party if it is to be sustained.
Strassmann and Queller do a fine
job of laying out all the devices by which cheating is controlled and
cooperation ensured in these social amoebae.
They frequently use the language of political theory: social contracts, “veils
of ignorance”, etc. These terms are
partially metaphorical, but only partially.
There is a genuine social contract in force among these tiny
citizens. There are genuine conflicts of
interest, concessions, sanctions, and a general interest.
Instead of reducing the higher
animals to the lowest ones, biology is busy elevating the lowest ones. I know enough about Socrates, Plato, and
Aristotle, to know who wins here.
Socrates spent most of his time in Plato’s dialogues arguing with
Sophists. The latter argued that justice
was a mere human invention, contrary to nature, employed by the weak to hobble
the strong. Socrates argued to the
contrary that justice was something real, intrinsic to the nature of
things. The strongest, he argued, had as
much interest in justice as the weaker.
Contemporary biology is proving
Socrates right. Principles of justice
govern when slime mold clones congregate, honey bees operate their colonies,
and the Continental Congress does the constitutional thing. None of this deprives the lower organic and
inorganic levels of the freedom to fully reveal themselves as what they
are. One cannot, however, understand any
of this if one views the high solely in the light of the low.
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