Leo Strauss distinguished between
statesman, legislators, and political philosophers in this way: the first are
concerned with political decisions at a particular place and time; the second,
with decisions for a political place but with a mind to the future and perhaps
future generations. The last are
concerned with the nature of politics across all places and times. I like that neat account and I think it is
generally correct. Here, doing a bit of
political philosophy, I will add another trichotomy.
We human beings live in
regimes. The regime was Strauss’s
translation of the Greek term poleteia. This term is sometimes translated as polity
or republic. It is the title of Plato’s
most famous book. It refers to a
political community and includes its social structure, governing body and
institutions, and its culture. I suspect
that Strauss chose it because of its famous use in the phrase “ancien regime,”
which indicated the poleteia in France before the revolution. The most fundamental kind of revolution, as
Aristotle and Plato recognized, involves a change of regimes. The people and the place are the same
(mostly, as some may have lost their heads) but the social structure, political
powers, and ethos have changed in a profound way.
Where do regimes come from? I propose three foundations: nature, culture,
and deliberate action. Modern
social-political thought since the 19th century has tended to focus
on the second. The most influential
figures (I suggest Marx, Weber and Freud as examples) tended to reduce
deliberate action to a largely derivative role.
Human beings act in strictly confined circumstances and when they are
supposedly free to act they only express what their culture, class
consciousness, etc., have taught them to express. Nature was likewise diminished in most of
modern social thought, though it at least appears in Marxism in the form of
economic history. Culture has been the
dominant theme.
The Nineteenth Century is,
finally and blessedly, coming to an end in the Twenty-First. At this point, only prejudice or ignorance or
both would allow someone to believe that the biological nature of human beings
is not the basic foundation of human minds and human lives, individually and
collectively. We are a social and
political species because we inherited these traits from our ancestors. Our political and social lives depend upon a
pallet of emotions that were shaped by natural selection. Culture can only work on the material that
nature has provided. As it is easy to
domestic a horse but not a zebra, so it is easy to teach human beings to be
nervous about sex but very difficult to teach them to stop doing it.
No one argues that nature is
everything but some do argue that culture is everything. The latter have long been at war with those
who argue that nature is at least something.
There are two ways to end a war: conquest or reconciliation. They are not mutually exclusive. Those who argue that nature is a major factor
in human social and political behavior are going to win because they are
obviously right. However, it is becoming
increasingly clear that the nature/nurture dichotomy was a false
dichotomy.
Human beings are by nature
capable of language but they have to learn a particular language. Infants can tell coherent speech, in whatever
language, from incoherent babble and they listen hungrily for the former. Linguistic culture is a part of human
nature. Children are born with a
capacity to recognize moral obligations and a hunger to learn the local
rules. They instinctively grasp the
difference between harm to an innocent (bad) and transgression of in-group
conventions (bad only for us). As we are
primed for language, we are also primed for both universal moral principles and
local law.
Anthropologist Christopher Boehm
has demonstrated (to my satisfaction) that the most natural human societies,
the ones that we lived in while we became human, were largely if not
universally egalitarian. Living in small
groups, individuals formed coalitions in order to defend their personal
autonomy against bullies and other free riders.
This required an egalitarian ethos, which is culture if anything
is. Etiquette compelled would be alpha
males to suppress their predatory instincts or else they faced ridicule,
ostracism, or death. The emergence of
egalitarian cultures among small band human communities was itself the result
of deliberate actions on the part of many members of such groups. They joined together to defend themselves
because they wanted to protect their own autonomy.
This went on for long enough that
it shaped human evolution. Our capacity
for morality is largely a result of deliberately making social rules and then
gradually, over long periods of time, internalizing those rules. Those human beings who did this successfully
were able to cooperate in a much more efficient way and so they came to
dominate the species. That is how
evolution works.
The relation between nature,
culture, and deliberate action is not one of mutually independent spheres. It is a dynamic. Each shapes the other over time. Trying to tease them apart is fruitful,
sometimes, but always difficult. This is
analogous to those who try to determine the genes for any given behavioral
trait. At each stage of human
development, our nature allowed certain possibilities. Among these was the development of
culture. Over time, we became as
dependent on culture as we were on language, because we were now dependent on
one another. Yet culture was nothing
other than the accumulation of decisions made and repeated by individuals interacting
with one another. Occasionally, some
powerful personality recognized the power of culture and deliberately set to
change it, laying down the foundations for a new one. Lycurgus’ founding of Sparta is the classical
account. The American founding is a
modern one.
Deliberate founding by one or a
small set of individuals is rare; but all regimes are deliberately founded in
another sense: they are the result of actions of human beings, responding to
disparate circumstances, modifying the cultures that they had to work
with. Human nature changes slower than
culture, yet it is shaped by culture and provides the foundation for culture in
turn. I do not hold with those who would
abandon the nature/nurture distinction.
You can’t understand a dynamic without understand how forces interact
with one another. Adding deliberate
action to the dichotomy can account for the existence and nature of
regimes.
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