tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-223797477664258632.post7835448731770719647..comments2023-09-11T01:18:18.763-07:00Comments on Natural Right and Biology: The Problem of MyselfKen Blanchardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09580209017016829598noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-223797477664258632.post-70214375996290847942015-10-22T20:13:43.996-07:002015-10-22T20:13:43.996-07:00Thank you very much for your response. This reply,...Thank you very much for your response. This reply, I'm afraid, is also characteristically late. I am struggling with the idea that an identical twin might be closer to being the same individual than two people who shared the same memories. Your suggestion makes me think of Abigail and Brittany Hensel, conjoined twins who share a body, but who are, nevertheless, very distinct people. Their personalities quite different, with one girl being more extroverted than the other. I think it would be a mistake to think that the fact that the two share most of their limbs and, of course, DNA, meant that they were not two separate individuals. <br /><br />I also think that if a man were to receive multiple transplants and thus was made up of parts that originated from different DNA than his original parts had come from he would still be the same individual as he had been before.<br /><br />But I am not sure what measure the amount of individuality in a person can be measured. How would you measure it? I look forward to reading more about the continuity of expected futures problem, should you choose to write about it in the future.Mirandahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17802771607675329059noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-223797477664258632.post-11903650410308629102015-10-09T20:08:50.817-07:002015-10-09T20:08:50.817-07:00Forgive this characteristically tardy response to ...Forgive this characteristically tardy response to your characteristically good question. What you describe in fact happens, if rather rarely. In the case of monozygotic twins, when a single zygote (fertilized cell) splits and becomes two embryos, one human individual (at least, biologically speaking) becomes two human individuals. <br /><br />Comparing that to the case of another human individual who somehow acquires my memories, I would argue that two identical twins are closer to being the same individual than two people with independent ontogeny who share the same memories, even if the latter pair are more alike than the former. <br /><br />However, I concede that it doesn't solve my breakfast problem. If my identical twin eats pancakes for breakfast tomorrow, I won't taste the maple syrup anymore than I would if the guy who shares my memories eats at the same pancake breakfast. <br /><br />I don't know how to explain the continuity of expected futures problem (I just coined the term). If continuous consciousness is real (and it is logically possible to doubt that it is) it seems to me that it has to be grounded in biological continuity. But biological continuity isn't enough. At some point in my ontogeny, a self emerged that had a future. I don't like mysteries. This is a big one. Ken Blanchardhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09580209017016829598noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-223797477664258632.post-66452578680823861642015-10-03T08:28:14.684-07:002015-10-03T08:28:14.684-07:00But wouldn't the cell theory have the same pro...But wouldn't the cell theory have the same problem as the memory theory? What if you were cloned and every cell in your clone's body came from the same cells as you? Technically, couldn't those cells also trace their lineage back to that single UR cell as well? Mirandahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09734054212740296271noreply@blogger.com